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GETTING BEYOND THE CROSSFIRE
PHENOMENON: A MILITANT MODERATE'S

TAKE ON THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AUTHORITY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Melissa A. Waters*
INTRODUCTION

Just a few weeks ago, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue that, in
many respects, kicked off the twenty-first-century debate over the
relationship between international law and the U.S. Constitution. In the
aptly named Kennedy v. Louisiana,I Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for
a five-member majority, held that the use of the death penalty for child rape
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. 2
For anti-death penalty advocates, Kennedy provides
important evidence that key victories of the last decade (in Roper v.
Simmons 3 and Atkins v. Virginia4) thus far have withstood the recent
conservative turn of the Court. For advocates of the use of foreign and
international law in constitutional interpretation, however, the decision
offers a very different, and bleaker, picture.
For international lawyers, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Kennedy is a far
cry from his groundbreaking majority opinion in Roper just three years
earlier. 5 Kennedy is striking in the absence from the opinion of any
discussion of foreign authority and the role that it should play in
constitutional interpretation. Justice Kennedy passed on the opportunity to
reiterate-and strengthen-Roper's holding that "international opinion" can

* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I am indebted to my friend and
mentor, Professor Peter Schuck of Yale Law School, who first introduced me to the term
"militant moderate." See PETER H. SCHUCK, MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODERATE: COOL
VIEWS ON HOT TOPiCS (2006).
1. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
2. Id. at 2646.
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. In Roper v. Simmons, Justice Anthony Kennedy delighted internationalists by
asserting that foreign authority could play a "confirmatory role" in constitutional analysis.
He commented, "It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins
to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations
and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom." Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

play a "confirmatory role" in constitutional analysis. 6 Gone, too, are
Roper's references to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
human rights treaties, 7 and its survey of foreign practices on the death
penalty.8 In short, in Kennedy, Justice Kennedy's powerful internationalist
voice fell strangely silent.
The reasons behind Justice Kennedy's apparent (perhaps temporary) loss
of enthusiasm for the internationalist enterprise must necessarily be left to
speculation. But he may well have been influenced by the increasingly
rancorous nature of the public debate over the role of foreign authority in
constitutional interpretation. Since Roper, that debate-in the news media,
in the blogosphere, and even before Congress-has fallen prey to what I
call the "Crossfire phenomenon." Like the old CNN news commentary
program, the Crossfire debate on foreign authority that has developed since
Roper is great fun to watch, but often completely unedifying from the
perspective of learning anything substantive about the complex issues
involved. So-called "nationalists" saw in Roper an enormous threat to the
very foundations of American democracy, and they have been fighting back
hard ever since. In the immediate wake of Roper, members of both the
House and the Senate introduced resolutions declaring that "judicial
determinations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States should not be based on ... [foreign precedent] unless such...

[foreign precedent] inform[s] an understanding of the original meaning of
the Constitution."9 At the confirmation hearings of both Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, conservative senators expressed the view
that a judge's citation of foreign precedent constituted an impeachable
offense.' 0 One prominent conservative scholar has even called for a
constitutional amendment banning the practice."I Many internationalists,
for their part, simply cannot understand what all of the fuss is about: they

6. Id. at 604.
7. See id at 576.
8. See id. at 576-77.
9. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
10. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
293
(2005)
(statement
of
Sen.
Tom
Coburn),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=I 09senatehearings&docid=f:
23539.wais; Confirmation Hearingon the Nominationof Samuel A. Alito, Jr.to Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471-72 (2006) (statement of Sen. Coburn), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109-senate-hearings&docid=f:
254 29.wais.
11. Professor Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz of Georgetown University Law Center called
for a constitutional amendment during remarks at a panel of the Federalist Society's annual
conference. See Showcase Panel, Akhil Reed Amar, Frank H. Easterbrook, Vicki C. Jackson,
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz & Janice Rogers Brown, The Constitution and American
Exceptionalism:
Citation of Foreign Law (Nov. 17, 2007), http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/publD.454/ pubdetail.asp (providing audio and video recordings of the
panel).
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remain convinced that citation to foreign authority raises no serious
legitimacy concerns whatsoever. 12
Some international lawyers and scholars find themselves, like myself, in
the uncomfortable middle of the Crossfire debate. As moderates-or
"militant moderates," to borrow Professor Peter Schuck's delightful turn of
phrase 3-we recognize and take seriously the legitimacy concerns voiced
by nationalists. At the same time, we agree with the internationalists that
foreign authority, properly considered, can and should play an important
role in constitutional interpretation. But with the increasing pressure to
"choose up sides" in this increasingly divisive debate, what's a militant
moderate to do?
The modest goal of this essay is to sketch out a militant moderate's take
on the role of foreign and international law in constitutional
interpretation-one that moves the debate beyond the Crossfire
phenomenon depicted in the popular press. I begin by framing the question
in terms of the broader (but often overlooked) issue that, in my view, is
really driving current debate: American judges' growing participation in
transnational judicial dialogue of various kinds. 14 I then briefly examine,
and critique, key arguments and assumptions of both internationalists and
Finally, I sketch out a militant moderate take on the
nationalists.
appropriate use of foreign authority in constitutional interpretation. Given
the brevity of this essay, I of course do not seek to provide a definitive
answer to complex questions that have been, and will continue to be,
considered elsewhere in much greater depth. 15 Instead, drawing on
previous scholarship, I suggest a possible analytical framework to consider
some of these questions-one that may help to strike a balance between the
legitimate concerns of nationalists and the equally legitimate aspirations of
internationalists.

12. My criticism of the "Crossfire phenomenon" is limited primarily to the way in which
this debate has played out in the popular press and before Congress. With some exceptions,
scholars on both sides of the issue have presented thoughtful, nuanced analyses of the
complex issues involved. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005); Eric A. Pbsner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law
of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Condorcet and
the Constitution: A Response to the Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281 (2007);
Comment, The Debate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV. 103
(2005).
13. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, MEDITATIONS OF A MILITANT MODERATE: COOL
VIEWS ON HOT Topics (2006).
14. See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of
TransnationalJudicialDialogue in Creating and Enforcing InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J.
487 (2005).
15. See, for example, the superb collections of essays in recent issues of the Harvard
Law Review, Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005), and the Stanford Law Review, Symposium,
Global Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2007). See also Melissa A. Waters,
CreepingMonism: The Judicial Trend Toward InterpretiveIncorporationof Human Rights
Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 658-59 & nn. 128-38 (2007).
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I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AS A FRAMING DEVICE
A militant moderate take on the debate over foreign authority in
American constitutional interpretation begins by recognizing the broader
phenomenon at the heart of the debate: the worldwide rise of what I have
elsewhere termed "transnational judicial dialogue."'1 6 The subject of much
scholarship and debate over the past several years, it is now a truism that
"courts the world over . . . are talking to one another."' 17

National,

supranational, and international courts are increasingly citing and
discussing at length foreign and international legal precedent on a wide
range of issues. Over time, this cross-citation among the world's courts has
developed into an informal kind of dialogue. Courts use judicial dialogue
to engage in a sort of intellectual cross-fertilization of ideas-or as Dean
Anne-Marie Slaughter has described it, a "process of collective judicial
18
deliberation on [common legal] problems."'
Nor is transnational judicial dialogue limited to constitutional
interpretation. We are increasingly seeing its emergence in areas as diverse
as bankruptcy, antitrust, intellectual property, and defamation law. 19 The
increasingly globalized nature of trade relations, the emergence of the
Internet, and related phenomena are driving the world's legal systems into
closer contact with one another. Judges, not surprisingly, are responding by
participating in various forms of dialogue-sometimes out of necessity,
sometimes out of a keen interest in learning from the experiences of their
foreign counterparts.
Viewed through this broader lens, cases like Roper-and, to a lesser
extent, Lawrence v. Texas and Atkins-seem to indicate an interest on the
part of some Supreme Court Justices in the emerging transnational judicial
dialogue. At a minimum, such cases reflect these Justices' desire to engage
their foreign counterparts in a cross-border conversation on the relevance of
international human rights standards in interpreting domestic constitutional
rights. But in a broader sense, these cases may also reflect a nascent
interest in transnational judicial dialogue more generally. Certainly, public
comments by some members of the Court indicate a growing interest in
American judges' participation in the emerging "world community" of
courts. 20 They may also reflect a growing understanding of the changing

16. See Waters, supra note 14.
17. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 371 (1997).
18. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.

REv. 99, 119 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 14, at 494-95, 538 (discussing transnational judicial
dialogue in bankruptcy and defamation contexts).
20. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. Soc'¥ INT'L L. PROC. 351,
355 (2005); Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
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nature of domestic courts in an increasingly globalized world-an
key intermediaries
understanding that the world's judges are emerging 2as
1
between the domestic and international legal systems.
A militant moderate takes the emergence of a globalizing judiciary, and
the rise of the domestic judge as a key transnational intermediary, as givens.
Moreover, the militant moderate tends to view the Roper debate through
this broader lens, recognizing that it is not simply a debate over the
relevance of foreign authority in American constitutional interpretation. In
a larger sense, it is a debate over the role that U.S. courts will play in
transnational judicial dialogue on a wide range of legal issues. And the
outcome of the debate on constitutional interpretation will likely have
spillover effects into other legal arenas (like intellectual property and
defamation law), where transnational judicial dialogue is increasingly
prominent.
Finally, a militant moderate recognizes that the outcome of this debate
will have both internal and external implications. It will, of course, have an
important impact on U.S. courts' jurisprudential approaches to
constitutional interpretation and other issues of domestic law. Just as
importantly, however, the outcome of the debate will play a key role in
shaping the future development of U.S. courts' roles as intermediaries
between domestic and international law. As I have argued elsewhere,
transnational judicial dialogue is emerging as an important medium for the
creation and development of international legal norms on a variety of
issues. 22 To the extent that U.S. courts become active participants in
transnational judicial dialogue, they can position themselves to play a
powerful role in shaping and influencing the development of those norms.
If they are less active in the emerging dialogue-or if they remain isolated
from it-U.S. influence over the development of certain international legal
norms will wane. The militant moderate thus recognizes that robust
participation in transnational judicial dialogue offers both benefits and risks
for U.S. courts. That recognition is coupled, however, with a firm
conviction that American judges have both the capacity, and (within limits)
the legal authority, to choose wisely-to shape their participation in judicial
dialogue of various kinds in ways that maximize the benefits, while
minimizing the risks.
II. A MILITANT MODERATE'S TAKE ON THE CURRENT CROSSFIRE DEBATE
The notion that U.S. courts can actively shape their roles as participants
in transnational judicial dialogue has important implications for the current
Crossfire debate on constitutional interpretation. First, it calls for a certain
ratcheting down of the rhetoric, and a more nuanced presentation of
Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4,
2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 265-66 (2003).

21. See Waters, supra note 14, at 573-74.
22. See, e.g., id.
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arguments in the public arena by both nationalists and internationalists. For
example, advocates of the robust use of foreign authority in constitutional
interpretation defend Roper by contending that it is part of a venerable
judicial tradition of respect for, and consideration of, international law in
the U.S. legal system. They sometimes quote the Supreme Court's famous
passage in the Paquete Habana case: "International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
23
duly presented for their determination."
Nationalists, for their part, retort that reliance on foreign authority to
interpret constitutional rights represents a dramatic departure from
American tradition. Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, has expressed his
conviction that the Founders would be "appalled" by the proposition that
the Court might rely on foreign precedent and practice to strike down
24
democratically adopted death penalty laws.
For the militant moderate, the truth lies somewhere in between. While I
am not at all convinced that the Founders would be appalled by the Roper
Court's citation to international human rights standards, I am confident that
they would be very, very surprised. And this is to be expected: after all,
international human rights law as we know it today is largely a creature of
the latter half of the twentieth century. While it is entirely possible that the
Founders-and the early Supreme Court Justices-would applaud the
Court's decision in Roper, it is also true that the Paquete Habana case and
other historical precedents (to put it mildly) are not exactly on all fours with
that decision.
In short, there is something new going on here-and that "something
new" may raise all sorts of legitimacy concerns that prior courts simply
have not addressed. To establish the legitimacy of the internationalist
enterprise-particularly as it pertains to international human rights lawadvocates of U.S. court participation in transnational judicial dialogue
would do well to acknowledge that American judges (along with other
courts around the world) are operating largely in uncharted waters.
Nationalists, for their part, would do well to recognize that at least in
certain contexts other than human rights, U.S. courts have long been willing
to consider both foreign and international law in their work. As Professor
Sarah Cleveland has convincingly demonstrated, the Supreme Court-far
from being a parochial isolationist court-has historically interpreted and
23. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
24. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Association of
Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan.
13, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts

("If you told the

framers of the Constitution that [what the Supreme Court is] after is to ...do something that
will be just like Europe, they would have been appalled."); cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The
Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the proposition that.., the American
peoples' democratic adoption of the death penalty ...could be judicially nullified because of

the disapproving views of foreigners.").
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applied international law to a wide variety of legal issues. 25 Professor
Steven Calabresi's research indicates similar Supreme Court practices with
26
respect to the history of comparative law in constitutional interpretation.
Thus, while internationalists are occasionally guilty of overselling the
historical pedigree of decisions like Roper, the historical precedent does
suggest a longstanding judicial respect for, and willingness to take into
account, foreign and international authority. Again, historical pedigree
alone may not satisfy the legitimacy concerns raised by the very different,
and much more robust, forms of transnational judicial dialogue emerging in
the twenty-first century. But at a minimum, recent scholarship provides
convincing evidence that participation in that dialogue is not quite the
dramatic departure from the American democratic tradition that some
nationalists might have us believe.
The notion that U.S. courts can actively shape their roles as participants
in transnational judicial dialogue has a second key implication for the
current Crossfire debate over constitutional interpretation. It suggests that
participants in the debate should place more emphasis on the dialogic nature
of these transnational judicial conversations. Instead, advocates on both
sides often seem to characterize the role of foreign authority in
constitutional interpretation as a sort of unidirectional monologue, in which
U.S. courts are always on the receiving end. Internationalists trumpet the
educational (or "persuasive") benefits of this one-way monologue, arguing
that we have much to learn from foreign legal systems. Nationalists, for
judicial
their part, insist that the monologue amounts to little more than the
27
imposition of "' foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.'
The militant moderate, by contrast, emphasizes what I have elsewhere
termed the co-constitutive nature of transnational judicial dialogue on
constitutional interpretation. 28 The relationship between and among courts
participating in dialogue is more properly conceived of as a co-constitutive,
or synergistic, relationship in which domestic courts actively participate in
the dynamic process of developing transnational and international legal
norms. As Dean Harold Koh has noted, courts "help[] ...to develop the
29
norms that become part of the fabric of emerging international society,"
and, at the same time, help to ensure that these norms "seep into, are
internalized, and become entrenched in domestic legal and political
processes." 30 In other words, transnational judicial dialogue-whether on
25. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 3363 (2006).
26. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743 (2005).

27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster
v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
28. See Waters, supra note 14, at 492; supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
29. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2655 (1997) (book review).
30. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 205 (1996).
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constitutional interpretation or otherwise-serves as the engine by which
domestic courts collectively engage in the co-constitutive process of
international norm creation and internalization. And domestic courts
participating in that dialogue can serve as active-and proactiveintermediaries between their own domestic legal systems, on the one hand,
and foreign and international legal systems, on the other.
The co-constitutive nature of transnational judicial dialogue opens up the
possibility that American judges might serve not only as importers of
foreign and international legal norms, but also as transnational champions
of American legal norms. Take the emerging transnational judicial
dialogue on hate speech as one example. 3 1 The U.S. legal system diverges
sharply from European legal systems in offering liberal protections for hate
speech. U.S. courts might react to this divergence in two ways. First, a
court adopting a "unidirectional monologue" perspective would take the
view that because American and European speech norms are so
fundamentally different, European legal precedent and practice on hate
speech has no educational or persuasive value. The court would conclude
that participation in judicial dialogue with European courts (through citation
and discussion of European legal precedents) would likewise have no value,
and it would choose nonparticipation.
A U.S. court adopting a "co-constitutive dialogue" approach, by contrast,
would recognize that there might still be value to participation in
transnational judicial dialogue on hate speech. By citing, discussing, and,
where appropriate, distinguishing European authority on hate speech, the
court could effectively champion American First Amendment norms on the
transnational and international planes. This approach would offer at least
two possible benefits. First, the U.S. court's opinion would have
educational/persuasive value for judges in developing legal systems around
the world whose laws on the issue are still in flux-and who may well
choose to adopt the more liberal American model over the more restrictive
European model. Second, and more importantly, active U.S. court
participation in the dialogue would ensure a robust American voice in the
international discourse on hate speech, encouraging emerging international
human rights standards on speech to develop in ways that remain sensitive
to American First Amendment concerns.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE CROSSFIRE DEBATE: A MODEST PROPOSAL

One of the goals of this essay is, in a sense, to recharacterize the question
at the heart of the Crossfire debate: Should U.S. courts-following the lead
of courts throughout the common law world-participate in the emerging
(and increasingly robust) transnational judicial dialogue on constitutional
interpretation? For the militant moderate, the answer is, "It depends." In
the militant moderate's view, the legitimacy of transnational judicial
dialogue on constitutional interpretation depends entirely on how domestic
31. See Waters, supra note 14, at 531-38.
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courts go about participating in and shaping that dialogue. The militant
moderate thus focuses on methodology, believing that the entire enterprise
is only as legitimate as the underlying methods used by the courts to build
the dialogue.
In other words, the key questions that we should be asking are: How are
courts taking into account foreign and international legal norms in their
work? What interpretive techniques are they using? Which of those
techniques have proven effective, and which can be considered
"legitimate"? And how do we think about issues of methodological
"legitimacy" in this context?
My previous work on the role of international treaties in constitutional
interpretation offers one possible analytical framework for exploring these
questions. 32 I examined all decisions over a seven-year period from the
constitutional courts of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States,
and the Commonwealth Caribbean, in which the courts relied on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
interpreting domestic constitutional rights. 33 I found that the interpretive
techniques relied on by the various courts tend to fall on a sort of
spectrum-from the modest use of international treaties as a kind of value
added, to a much more radical approach that would require harmonization
34
of domestic constitutional law with international human rights norms.
Current Supreme Court practice with respect to treaties has thus far been
limited to the most conservative technique: the use of human rights treaties
to gild the domestic lily. 35 In this technique, a court points to international
treaty provisions as a kind of value added-that is, as additional support for
its interpretation (based on domestic sources of law) of a constitutional
provision. The internal logic of the court's opinion is rooted in domestic
sources; for that reason, the integrity of the opinion would stand even if the
Indeed, discussion of
discussion of treaties were excised entirely.
international law often seems to be tacked on as a sort of afterthought to a
detailed discussion of domestic law.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper, at first blush, is a quintessential
example of the gilding the lily technique. 36 He first concluded that a
domestic consensus existed supporting abolition of the juvenile death
32. See Waters, supra note 15, at 694-704.
33. I also examined the role of treaties in shaping the common law, and in statutory
interpretation. Id. at 652-91.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 654-60.

36. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Another example is Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which she used human rights
treaties to buttress the proposition in the majority opinion that the use of race in law school
admissions decisions "'must have a logical end point."' 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion). She noted that the majority's approach
"accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action," and she
quoted human rights treaty provisions as evidence of this "international understanding." Id.;
see also Waters, supra note 15, at 655 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's approach).
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penalty. He then cited the ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child as evidence of an international consensus supporting abolition. He
contended that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions. '37 Taken at face value, the
"confirmatory role" that Justice Kennedy ascribes to international opinion
seems to be a fairly innocuous kind of international "window dressing" for
an opinion otherwise firmly rooted in domestic law. (Of course, whether
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper should be taken at face value is another
matter altogether, one that is beyond the scope of this essay but that I and
38
other scholars have explored in previous work.)
Further along the spectrum is a somewhat more aggressive technique for
utilizing international treaties in constitutional interpretation: a technique
that I call "contextual interpretation." Rather than simply gilding the lily
with international law sources, courts utilizing the contextual approach
tightly interweave discussion of international treaties into their analysis of
domestic legal sources. The courts do not consider the treaties to be
binding; instead, they rely on them for their persuasive value, considering
them useful in elucidating the meaning of domestic constitutional
provisions.
The Canadian Supreme Court frequently utilizes the contextual
interpretation technique in interpreting certain limitations provisions in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, Section 7 of the
Charter guarantees "[e]veryone ... the right to life, liberty and security...
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. '39 The Canadian Supreme Court
frequently utilizes the ICCPR and other treaties to interpret the scope of the
"fundamental justice" limitation. International human rights law is used for
its persuasive value, often tipping the balance in favor of a rights-conscious
interpretation of the Charter. 40 As former Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub&
commented in describing the contextual approach,
[I]n seeking the meaning of the Canadian Constitution, the courts may be
informed by international law. Our concem is not with Canada's
international obligations [as] obligations [per se]; rather, our concern is
with the principles of fundamental justice. We look to international law
as evidence of these principles and not as controlling in itself.4 1

37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
38. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 15, at 658-60 & nn. 126-43; Ernest A. Young, Foreign
Law and the DenominatorProblem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).
39. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11, § 7 (U.K.).
40. For a thorough discussion of the Canadian approach, see Waters, supra note 15, at
673.
41. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 3, 38 (Can.).
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Finally, at the far end of the spectrum is a much more radical technique
known as the constitutional Charming Betsy4 2 canon. In this technique, a

domestic constitutional provision is construed in conformity with the
country's international human rights law obligations. Advocates of the
canon argue that, "[w]here the [c]onstitution is ambiguous, [a] [c]ourt
should adopt that meaning which conforms to the principles of universal
than an interpretation which would involve a
and fundamental rights rather
43
departure from such rights."
In most common law countries, the constitutional Charming Betsy canon
has not yet made its way into the mainstream of judicial practice, instead
remaining the object of human rights amicus briefs and the occasional
dissenting opinion. One court, however, has utilized the technique in
several opinions: the British Privy Council, which until recently served as
the final court of appeal on constitutional matters for several countries in
the Commonwealth Caribbean. The Privy Council has utilized international
human rights treaties as more than mere persuasive evidence of the
international community's normative commitments (unlike the Canadian
Supreme Court). Instead, it has asserted that the treaties represent binding
obligations on domestic courts in the region to interpret44 "ambiguous"
constitutional provisions consistently with international law.
My goal here is not to critically assess these interpretive techniques, nor
to express views as to which techniques might be legitimate for use by U.S.
courts (both questions which I have taken up at length elsewhere). 45
Instead, I have briefly described a range of available techniques simply to
make a straightforward point-but one that is too often overlooked in the
current Crossfire debate. Judicial participation in transnational judicial
dialogue on constitutional interpretation is not a straightforward
always/never, for/against proposition. Instead, dialogue takes a variety of
forms, and courts worldwide have developed a range of techniques-some
quite modest, others fairly radical-to participate in that dialogue.
Similarly, American judges participating in dialogue can choose among the
various techniques-and perhaps develop new approaches that are uniquely
appropriate to American legal and democratic traditions.
42. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.).
43. Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337, 417 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harry Blackmun also urged such an approach, commenting, "it ... is
appropriate to remind ourselves that the United States is part of the global community...
and that courts should construe our statutes, our treaties, and our Constitution, where
possible, consistently with 'the customs and usages of civilized nations."' Harry A.
Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,49 (1994) (quoting
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
44. See, e.g., Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472, 489 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Jam.) (using international law to interpret provisions of Jamaican
Constitution with regard to law requiring mandatory death penalty); Lewis v. Attorney Gen.
of Jam., [2001] 2 A.C. 50, 80-85 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.) (U.K.) (requiring that
Jamaica stay execution pending decision of international tribunal).
45. See Waters, supra note 15, at 652-99.
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CONCLUSION

Since Roper, the Crossfire debate between nationalists and
internationalists has both dominated and muddied public discourse over the
role of foreign authority in constitutional interpretation. More importantly,
that debate has prevented the development of a rich, nuanced discourse over
the role of American judges in the emerging transnational judicial dialogue
on a wide range of issues. This essay represents a modest effort to move
beyond the Crossfire debate by reconceptualizing it, and by offering a more
nuanced, "militant moderate" alternative to existing nationalist and
internationalist conceptions.
Unlike those conceptions, the militant
moderate approach focuses on methodology: it recognizes the existence of
a range of possible interpretive approaches that courts might use to
participate in dialogue on constitutional interpretation. In so doing, it urges
courts to view the enterprise as a true dialogue among the world's courts:
as participants in the dialogue, American judges can serve not only as
internalizers of foreign norms, but also as champions of American norms at
the transnational level.
Of course, shifting the terms of the debate in this way does not obviate
the legitimacy issues inherent in any discussion of U.S. courts' citation to
foreign authority in constitutional interpretation. It can, however, shift the
normative debate in the popular discourse onto more helpful ground. The
militant moderate approach urges those involved in the public debate on
these issues to abandon the always/never, for/against dichotomies of the
Crossfire phenomenon. It urges them instead to adopt a more nuanced
analysis of "when" and "where"-that is, in which specific contexts, and
using which specific interpretive techniques-citation to foreign authority
may be appropriate.

